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UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW
INTERNATIONAL CONFLICT OF LAWS-
THE PROTECTIVE PRINCIPLE IN
EXTRATERRITORIAL CRIMINAL JURISDICTION
Appellant, an alien, was prosecuted in a federal district court for false
statements made at an American consulate in Mexico in order to procure
a nonquota immigrant visa.' The court based its denial of a motion to
dismiss on the ground that jurisdiction was established by reference to the
offense against the integrity of the United States, irrespective of the
locus of the crime and the nationality of the defendant. On appeal, held,
affirmed: there are no constitutional prohibitions against the exercise of
jurisdiction, under the "protective" principle, over an alien found within
the sovereign's territory. Rocha v. United States, 29 U.S.L. WEEK 2411
(9th Cir. 1961), petition for cert. filed, 29 U.S.L. WEErK 3331 (U.S.
April 28, 1961) (No. 932).
International jurists postulate five possible referents for the exercise of
criminal jurisdiction:2 (1) the territorial principle, jurisdiction being based
on the locus of the crime as within the state's geographical boundaries;
(2) the nationality principle, jurisdiction being founded on the allegiance of
the citizen-defendant to the prosecuting state, although the crime was
committed abroad; (3) the protective principle, jurisdiction being predicated
on the national interest injured by the offense committed abroad; (4) the
universality principle, jurisdiction resting on custody of the alien offender,
and (5) the passive personality principle, jurisdiction being laid on the
nationality of the injured person.
Anglo-American jurists, presumably unable to shake off the Austinian
concept of state sovereignty,3 traditionally limited criminal jurisdiction to
the state within whose geographical limits the offense occurred, whether the
defendant were a citizen or an alien.4 The "big name" literature of early
American law is studded with evidence of this preoccupation with the
"locus" of the crime., But the demands of federalism soon pressured the
1. The indictment was under Grimes and Criminal Procedure, 18 U.S.C. § 1546
(1958), which provides fine or imprisonment for fraud and misuse of visas, permits,
and other entry documents.
2. Harvard Research in International Law, Jurisdiction with Respect to Crimes,
29 Am. J. INT'L L. 443, 445 (Supp. 1935).
3. Cook, The Application of the Criminal Law of a Country to Acts Committed
by Foreigners Outside the Jurisdiction, 40 V. VA. L.Q. 303, 326 (1934).
4. Harvard Research in International Law, supra note 2 at 544: "Great Britain
and the United States . . . [basel their penal competence almost exclusively upon the
territorial and personal principles .. "5. See, for example, STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS §§ 17, 18
(8th ed. 1883): "[Nlo state or nation can by its laws directly affect or bind property
out of its own territory, or persons not resident therein, whether they are natural-born
subjects or others . . . . It would be equivalent to a declaration that the sovereignty
over a territory was never exclusive in any nation, but only concurrent with that of all
nations; that each could legislate for all, and none for itself; and that all might
establish rules which none were bound to obey." (Emphasis added.) See also Holmes T.,
in American Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co., 213 UIS. 347, 356 (1909): "[Tlhe
general and almost universal rule is that the character of an act as lawful or unlawful
must be determined wholly by the law of the country where the act is done."
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American courts into rather picturesque fictions. In Simpson v. State,6 the
defendant shot across the Savannah River from the South Carolina shore,
but missed the complaining witness who was boating in the Georgia portion
of the river. The "ball" embedded itself in Georgia soil. Concluding that
the locus of the attempted murder was in Georgia, the Georgia court
reasoned that "if a man in the state of South Carolina criminally fires
a ball into the state of Georgia, the law regards him as accompanying the
ball, and as being represented by it, up to the point where it strikes." 7
The so-called "effects" doctrine was rationalized as an "objective"
application of the territorial rule. And, in Strassheim v. Dailey," no less a
jurist than Mr. Justice Holmes added his authority to the disfiguration by
finding that although the defendant perpetrated his fraud on a Michigan
penal agency from Chicago, the locus of the crime was Michigan, where
the harmful "effects" were felt, and not Illinois, where the act was
committed.
Additionally, an exception to the territorial rule was provided by the
second jurisdictional referent mentioned above, the nationality principle.9
Several American courts have employed this doctrine,t 0 but have typically
qualified it by requiring that the act must have produced deleterious "effects"
in the United States. 1 And, of course, this exception left open the question
of aliens who had committed crimes against the United States abroad.
Continental jurists, meanwhile, were expanding extraterritorial criminal
jurisdiction to include offenses committed abroad, even by aliens, if the
crime threatened the "security, integrity or independence" of the state
seeking to prosecute. 12 The protective theory, based on self-defense, assumed
that "the legislation of the State where the crime is committed will be
inadequate."'-'  From an examination of Continental Codes, it is clear that
the theory was designed primarily to punish crimes in which the locus of
6. 92 Ga. 41, 17 S.E. 984 (1893).
7. Id. at 42, 17 S.E. at 985.
8. 221 U.S. 280 (1911).
9. Cf. text following note 2 sup~ra.
10. Notably United States v. Bowman, 260 U.S. 94, 98 (1922), in which there
can also be found evidence of the protective principle. Jurisdiction over three United
States nationals who defrauded this country, partially on the high seas and partially
in the port of Rio de Janeiro, was upheld "because of the right of the Government
to defend itself against obstruction, or fraud wherever perpetrated, especially if
committed by its own citizens, officers or agents." (Emphasis added.) Other cases
utilizing the nationality referent are: Steele v. Bulova Watch Co., 344 U.S. 280 (1952);
Skiriotes v. Florida, 313 U.S. 69 (1941); Blackmer v. United States, 284 U.S. 421 (1932).
11. Of the cases cited in note 10 supra, only the Blackmer decision displayed
no concern with the territorial locus of the crime.
12. Harvard Research in International Law, supra note 2, at 546: "The States
assuming penal competence upon the protective principle include practically all States
other than the United States and Great Britain. Nearly all of these States apply laws
for the protection of their security, integrity or independence -to offences committed
abroad either by nationals or aliens."
13. Id. at 553.
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the crime would likely have little interest, typically political crimes and
offenses against national currency or documents.14
The instant case, and the decision from which it was appealed, are
significant because they are the first explicit assertions of the protective
principle in the United States. However, bits and pieces of the doctrine
are evident from prior cases. In an early Texas case,15 the court found
constitutional a local statute authorizing the conviction of persons forging
Texas land titles in Louisiana. With obvious good sense, which many
subsequent decisions seem to have ignored, the court said:
Such acts are offenses against the State of Texas and her citizens
only, and can properly be tried in her courts. It may in fact be
no crime against the State in which it is perpetrated; and if it is,
under such circumstances as we are considering, that other State
would have no interest in punishing it, and would rarely, if ever,
do so.16
The Seventh Circuit, in United States ex rel. Maika v. Palmer,7
upheld the deportation of an alien who had made false statements to a
United States consul in Poland in order to obtain a passport. The
rationale depended in the main on the questionable 8 conclusion that the
consulate was United States territory and that the United States was
therefore the locus of the crime. But the court also indicated that the
crime was against the United States and not Poland, so that whether the
perjury was indictable in Poland was immaterial.' 9
In United States v. Archer,'0 a federal district court in California
convicted a defendant-alien of perjury for making false statements before
the United States consul in Mexico while applying for a non-immigrant
visa. The court again relied on the theory that the consulate was United
States territory, and to a lesser extent on the protective principle (unwit-
tingly, as had the Palmer court). Interestingly, the court became enmeshed
in the "effects" doctrine by likening the "effect" of actually entering the
United States by means of an illegally obtained visa to the "effect" of a
mail fraud which is begun abroad but which causes harmful results within
the United States.21
An abrupt turnabout to this line of immigration cases came with
14. Id. at 546-47. For example, Article 7 of the French Code d'Instruction
Criminelle authorizes prosecution of aliens who, outside of French territory, are guilty
of "un crime attentatoire a la suretM de l'Etat, ou de. contrefacon du sceau de l'Etat,
de monnaies nationales ayant cours, de papiers nationaux. . .." See de Vabres, LES
PRINCIPES MODERNES Du DROIT PENAL INTERNATIONAL 86, 87, (1928).
15. Hanks v. State, 13 Tex. Crim. 289 (1882).
16. Id. at 308-09.
17. 67 F.2d 146 (7th Cir. 1933).
18. 2 HACKWORTII, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 622-23 (1941).
19. 67 F.2d 146, 147 (7th Cir. 1933).
20. 51 F. Supp. 708 (S.D. Cal. 1943).
21. Id. at 710.
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United States v. Baker.22  Confronted with similar facts, 23 a New York
District Court found that "'the crime must be committed within the
territorial jurisdiction of the sovereignty . . . in order to give that sovereign
jurisdiction.' "24 Moreover, since the defendant was an alien, the exception
to this general rule, wherein "jurisdiction . . . is predicated upon the
citizenship of the offender rather than the locus of the crime . . .,,2* was
inapplicable. Finally, the "effects" doctrine, or "objective" application of
the territorial rule, could not be employed since there were no "effects"
within the territorial limits of the United States: "Here the defendant's
crime was complete the moment she made the false statement; no further
acts within the United States were necessary to complete the offense."26
The instant case was commenced in the Southern District Court of
California. 27  In a remarkably thorough exposition, the court swept aside
as untenable the notion that United States consulates were pieces of United
States territory for the purpose of determining the locus of a crime,28 gave
short shrift to the Baker court's preoccupation with the "effects" doctrine,23
and stood unequivocally on the protective principle, determining jurisdiction
by reference to the national interest injured by the offense.30 Recognizing
the conflict between the territorial principle of jurisdiction and the protective
22. 136 F. Supp. 546 (S.D.N.Y. 1955).
23. Proceeding was on a motion to dismiss an indictment charging an alien with
falsifying and concealing a material fact while abroad in reference to immigration.
24. 136 F. Supp. 546, 547 (S.D.N.Y. 1955), quoting from Yenkichi Ito v. United
States, 64 F.2d 73, 75 (9th Cir. 1933).
25. United States v. Baker, 136 F. Supp. 546, 548 (S.D.N.Y. 1955).
26. Id. at 548-49. (Emphasis added.) For a student note criticizing the Baker
decision, not because the protective principle was not applied, but because the
"objective" application of the territorial principle was misapplied, see Note, 45 CALIF.
L. REV. 199 (1957).
27. United States v. Rodriguez, 182 F. Supp. 479 (S.D. Cal. 1960).
28. Id. at 492, court's footnote 13.
29. After stating that the court in United States v. Baker, 136 F. Supp. 546
(S.D.N.Y. 1955), had concluded "that some further act would have to be done within
the United States in order to have some effect within the United States," the
Rodriguez court, 182 F. Supp. 479, 493-94 (S.D. Cal. 1960), argued against the
historical Anglo-American search for objective effects within the prosecuting state:
"When a crime coming within the scope of the protective theory of jurisdiction is
involved, that detrimental effect takes place through the effect upon the sovereignty of
the state." (Emphasis added.) But the court further found, mistakenly it is believed,
that the "effects" doctrine in Anglo-American precedent has been applied only to
extraterritorial offenses against citizens, rather than the government. Where the
government is affected, the court maintained that the protective theory has always
been the historical answer. As its only authority for this latter proposition, the court
relies in footnote 8 on dicta from Church v. Hubbart, 12 U.S. (2 Cranch) 187
(1804). United States v. Bowman, 260 U.S. 94 (1922), seems ample evidence to
the contrary. There, although the offense was fraud on the federal government, the
United States Supreme Court still struggled to find "effects" within this country to
justify an objective application of the territorial rule, in addition to the nationality
referent. Although some phrasing in the opinion points obliquely to the protective
principle, main reliance was clearly on the territorial and nationality rules.
30. "From the body of international law, the Congress may pick and choose
whatever recognized principle of international jurisdiction is necessary to accomplish the
purpose sought by the legislation. . . . Thus, having found that the protective principle
exists as a recognized doctrine of international law . . . it becomes a principle that
Congress can rightfully incorporate into its legislation. United States v. Rodriguez,
182 F. Supp. 479, 491 (S.D. Cal. 1960).
1961]
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theory of extraterritorial jurisdiction, the court argued that the typical crime
reached by the protective principle is offensive, not to the nation in which
it was committed, but to the integrity of the state seeking to prosecute.
Therefore, the locus of the crime would normally have little or no interest
in punishing the offender. Moreover, certain safeguards should be imposed:
the act complained of may not have been "'committed in the exercise of a
liberty guaranteed the alien by the law of the place where it was com-
mitted.'"a3 In addition, the country seeking jurisdiction must presently
have the defendant within its territorial limits. 32
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit affirmed,3 3 but through an unfortunate
misinterpretation of the district court decision wriggled back into the
territorial principle-a much safer ground in Anglo-American law:
Obviously the decision below herein rested not only on the act
abroad, but also on the effect it produced within the boundaries
of the United States, namely, the aliens' subsequent successful
entrance at the border based on a document allegedly procured
by fraud.34
This is a needless anachronism. In effect the court is reverting to such
ponderous considerations as whether a "ball" shot across the Savannah
River from South Carolina into Georgia constitutes attempted murder in
the former state, locus of the "act," or the latter state, locus of the "effect."
Not only did the Ninth Circuit implant the territorial principle in the
decision below while in fact the district court did not rely on it,31 but it
also garbled the two theories:
The acts ... were all done outside the state, but they were intended
(at least at the point of time when the fraudulent document was
used to gain entry) to produce, and did produce, a detrimental
affect on the sovereignty of the United States. Thus under the
"protective principle," less well known than "the territorial prin-
ciple," . . . there is, and should be, jurisdiction.30
There is good reason to make criminal jurisdiction extraterritorial
with reference to aliens. "So long as the State within whose territory
such offences are committed fails to take adequate measures, competence
must be conceded to the State whose fundamental interests are
threatened."3 1 On the other hand, reasonable grounds of objection have
been found: one critic has argued from common venue concepts, such
as the relative ease of gathering evidence, that "the social order of a
31. Id. at 489, citing Harvard Research in International Law, note 2 supra, at 543.
32. United States v. Rodriguez, 182 F. Supp. 479, 489 (S.D. Cal. 1960), citing
the S.S. "Lotus," P.C.I.J., ser. A, No. 10 (1927).
33, Rocha v. United States, 29 U.S.L. \TEEK 2411 (9th Cir. 1961).
34. Ibid. (Emphasis added.)
35. See note 29 supra.
36. Rocha v. United States, 29 U.S.L. WEEK 2411 (9th Cir. 1961).
37. Harvard Research in International Law, supra note 2, at 552.
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community should be restored where it has been upset." 38 Another critic
has expressed fear of varying and vague standards for "political" crimes
which are most often the subject of alleged extraterritorial jurisdiction. ' 9
The solution, which seems at once the most obvious and yet the most
difficult to achieve, would be to "develop a high degree of political
integration of the international community" in order to "impose upon
the territorial State the duty to punish those who within its jurisdiction
commit harmful acts against other States. '40 Oddly enough, the Anglo-
American bloc, which has shown itself least willing to adopt the protective
principle of extraterritorial jurisdiction, has also evinced the least initiative
in punishing persons within its borders who have committed crimes
against other states.41
If appropriate safeguards are employed,42 a flexible protective principle
seems indispensable to criminal law, at least until the hoped for "political
integration" of nations is attained. It is especially appropriate for immigra-
tion problems of the type presented by the instant case, as well as related
areas, such as extraterritorial counterfeiting of United States currency. 4
Other states are not likely to consider these prosecutions as infringements
on their territorial sovereignties, and what is more, would probably be
disinclined to spend their energies punishing these offenses. In any event,
if the punishment of aliens for crimes committed abroad is determined
to be a desirable end, it makes sense to adopt the protective principle
straightforwardly as a means, instead of torturing the territorial doctrine
out of shape to save the face of precedent.
ROBERT STAAL
38. Delaume, Jurisdiction Over Crimes Committed Abroad: French and American
Law, 21 CEO. WASH. L. REV. 173, 175 (1934).
39. Garcia-Mora, Criminal Jurisdiction Over Foreigners for Treason and Offenses
Against the Safety of the State Committed Upon Foreign Territory, 19 U. PTIrT. L.
REV. 567 (1958).
40. Id. at 590.
41. Harvard Research in International Law, supra note 2, at 552: "Some States.
such as Great Britain and the United States, while recognizing an obligation to afford
a minimum of protection, tend to adhere to the principle of 'political neutrality' and
to make a relatively fragmentary and incomplete provision for protecting the interests
of foreign States."
42. In the Harvard Research in International Law article, note 2 supra, at 557-61,
the following safeguards are suggested "with respect to the acts of aliens which may be
denounced as criminal": (1) although the offense need not be denounced by the
locus of the crime, still it may not be an act or omission committed in the exercise of
a liberty guaranteed by the locus of the crime; (2) the alien must have been taken
into custody by the State seeking to prosecute; (3) the alien must not have been previously
prosecuted by the territorial state, and (4) the alien shall be given a "fair trial before
an impartial tribunal."
43. Harvard Research in International Law, supra note 2, at 561.
